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LIBERALISING EMPLOYMENT SERVICES AT THE REGIONAL 
LEVEL: IMPLEMENTATION LESSONS FROM AN ITALIAN CASE 
Benedetta Trivellato and Mattia Martini 
ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the functioning of a public-private networked system for employ-
ment services’ provision implemented by Italy’s Lombardy region, and inspired by the 
principle of horizontal subsidiarity. Analysis of its implementation shows a considerable 
effort to apply the principles of quasi-markets and horizontal subsidiarity, and the re-
lated conditions for effectiveness and efficiency. Horizontal subsidiarity is meant to 
provide better responsiveness to users’ needs compared to other systems, and empha-
sises users’ freedom of choice. However, features of the analysed system such as the 
dominant market position of certain service providers, the enticement of users towards 
certain programmes, and weaknesses within the evaluation structure show that these 
same dimensions deserve closer scrutiny, together with medium-term examination of the 
overall system’s impact on equity.  
Keywords - active labour market policy (ALMP), public services, quasi-market, subsid-
iarity. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2001 the principle of horizontal subsidiarity was incorporated in the Italian Constitu-
tion, together with increased regional autonomy, stating that public administrations at 
different levels of government should favour initiatives by individuals and civil society 
organizations aimed at addressing public needs. Strongly supporting this principle and 
the related implications for the provision of public services, the Lombardy regional 
government devised an employment services system centred on a series of instruments 
which are meant to empower individuals and to build a services path tailored to their 
needs and characteristics. The focus on users’ freedom of choice is shown by the in-
strument which was developed to coordinate and finance this system, the ‘dote’ (literal-
ly ‘endowment’): individuals are provided with a financial endowment, which they can 
use to acquire labour market services supplied by public or accredited private agencies. 
The effort carried out by Lombardy’s government in the realm of active labour mar-
ket policies is not unique: based on a similar approach, many OECD countries have 
implemented reforms aimed at increasing competition between private and public pro-
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viders as instruments of active policies. This is, for instance, what happened in Australia 
in 1998, with the replacement of the previous Public Employment Services with a net-
work of approximately 200 private and non-profit providers (“Job Network”) (McDon-
ald and Marston, 2008), and in the Netherlands in 2000, where the reform has been sim-
ilar to the Australian case (Struyven and Steurs, 2005). A few years later, the British, 
Danish, and German governments introduced the possibility for private and non-profit 
providers to offer employment services target at disadvantaged individuals (Bredgaard 
et al., 2005; Jahn and Ochel, 2007).  
While the extant theoretical and empirical literature does provide indication of the 
design principles that need to be followed when planning such systems of public-private 
services provision, unexpected consequences may occur during the implementation 
phase, thereby providing appropriate lessons and insights both for theory and practice. 
This article therefore analyses the functioning of Lombardy’s system with a specific 
focus on the following design and implementation issues: 
• Which governance solutions were adopted to ensure the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of this system?  
• Do such solutions comply with the conditions set by the quasi-markets and 
horizontal subsidiarity theories? Which problems come into view from this 
experience?  
The research focuses on a single case study: the employment services system imple-
mented by the Lombardy government. Two main sources of data were used: (i) the da-
taset related to a project carried out by the Interuniversity Research Centre on Public 
Services (CRISP) at the University of Milano-Bicocca in collaboration with the research 
institute IReR (Istituto Regionale di Ricerca della Lombardia) and the Lombardy re-
gional government; (ii) information and details on the institutional dimensions and 
characteristics, which are provided by the Lombardy regional government and are pub-
licly available. The results of the analysis show that the benefits of horizontal subsidi-
arity in terms of better responsiveness to users’ needs and freedom of choice are not 
easily reached. Features of the analysed system such as the dominant market position of 
certain service providers, the enticement of users towards certain programs, the relative-
ly high socio-economic status of actual beneficiaries, and weaknesses within the evalua-
tion structure show that these same dimensions deserve closer scrutiny and adequate 
corrective mechanisms during the design phase, so as to avoid a potential negative im-
pact on equity. This is also linked to the diminishing effectiveness of one of the main 
aims of active labour market policies, improving the employability of disadvantaged 
individuals.   
The paper is organized as follows. Section two describes the theoretical framework, 
followed by a description of the methodology and data in section three. Section four 
analyses the case study and presents the results, while section five illustrates some con-
cluding considerations and suggestions for future research.  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The term ‘subsidiarity’ is shared by a number of analytical and ideological models (e.g. 
New Public Management, Third Way). But in the political culture of Lombardy, the 
term conveys a meaning of its own: «Subsidiarity is the idea that matters should be 
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handled by the lowest, or closest possible level to where they will have their effect.» 
(Colombo, 2008, p. 182). Whereas ‘vertical’ subsidiarity concerns the distribution of 
powers among different layers of the public sphere, ‘horizontal’ subsidiarity relates to 
the sharing of competences and initiatives between public and private actors. A funda-
mental feature of this framework – which also differentiates it from quasi-markets - is a 
combination of freedom and responsibility, both on the demand and the supply side 
(Brugnoli and Vittadini, 2008). On the demand side, users are given the freedom and 
responsibility to choose the services and providers who best suit their needs; on the 
supply side, providers are given the freedom and the responsibility to organize and 
manage their offering, by tailoring them on users’ needs. In other words, providers are 
trusted to make the right decisions for the implementation of policy goals, and users are 
trusted to make the right decisions for the satisfaction of their needs. 
Indeed, the Lombardy model can be analysed by means of a framework which ex-
tends the theory of quasi-markets (Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993) and consists of the fol-
lowing (Brugnoli and Vittadini, 2008; Colombo and O’Sullivan, 2012):  
1. separation between services financing and provision;  
2. freedom of choice, supported by instruments such as accreditation systems and 
quality control and evaluation; and  
3. fiscal subsidiarity, with instruments such as vouchers, endowments, tax deduc-
tions. 
Separation between services financing and provision 
The separation between the public actor financing the services and the actor(s) provid-
ing them, usually a mix of private and public organizations, is one of the main features 
of the theory of quasi-markets (Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993). Both private and public 
actors compete by offering services to users who can choose their preferred supplier, 
while the price of the services is paid by a public entity (Le Grand, 2007). In this sys-
tem, the public actor does not directly provide services, but maintains responsibility for 
the regulation and governance of the system, in addition to financing. This system re-
sembles a ‘market’ because the individual monopolistic (public) provider is replaced by 
a number of competing and independent providers. On the other hand, these markets 
differ from conventional markets in two respects: (i) on the supply side, competing pro-
viders are not necessarily profit-maximizing, nor private; (ii) on the demand side, users’ 
purchasing power is not expressed in monetary terms, rather it consists of a budget or a 
voucher to acquire a service, or it is centralised within a single purchasing agency.  
Quasi-markets require a number of conditions to be satisfied, in order to be more ef-
ficient and responsive – relative to alternative arrangements – without being less equita-
ble (Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993). For instance, the structure of the market needs to be 
competitive: this requires several providers, who should be allowed entry and exit, and 
several purchasers. The public actor needs to ensure that the quality is adequate even 
when the service is privately supplied, or that some specific services (such as those for 
the elderly) are available also when private providers do not operate (Greve, 2003), or 
that private providers do not create monopolies, with the associated risks in terms of 
higher prices or lower quality. All this implies a higher regulatory burden concerning 
quality and access to (high-quality) services also for weaker or disadvantaged users. 
Such regulatory commitment may involve higher transaction and coordination costs 
relative to other solutions; this depends on the degree of internal control which already 
characterizes public institutions. Lastly, a competitive market requires ineffective pro-
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viders to exit, but this will have a negative impact on the users which had nonetheless 
chosen those providers, and who will therefore have to make a different choice. Provid-
ers need to be motivated by financial considerations; otherwise they will not respond 
properly to market signals. Quasi-markets allow users access to services without paying 
for them, as long as they satisfy the requirements set by the public actor. This need-
based principle of consumption ensures equity. However, this happens only if opportu-
nities for ‘cream-skimming’, i.e. the adverse selection of the most expensive users (such 
as the chronically ill, or difficult children from a disadvantaged background, etc.), are 
minimized (Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993), as also the risk that more expensive users 
receive lower quality services (Propper et al., 2006).  
Freedom of choice 
Giving freedom of choice to users implies valuing the individual with his/her own needs 
(Le Grand 2003). Within a competitive system, freedom of choice is not only intrinsi-
cally valuable but also instrumental, as it generates incentives for providers to offer ef-
fectively a high-quality and responsive service. In fact, whenever providers suffer the 
consequences of not being chosen by users (for instance they lose access to public fund-
ing), they will be encouraged to improve service quality. This beneficial effect is 
reached by coupling freedom of choice for users and competition among providers. In 
the end however, the actual choice depends on the conditions and the context where it 
takes place. It is therefore important that different categories of individuals are given the 
opportunity to choose based on the relevant information: both the purchaser and the 
provider need to be able to access accurate information on the quality and cost of the 
service, without this process becoming too expensive (Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993; 
Fazzi, 2000). Offering adequate information to users may be expensive for service pro-
viders, and this may push up prices (Greve, 2003). On the other hand, providers cannot 
be entirely relied upon for complete and transparent information on quality, which re-
quires an independent monitoring and evaluation system (Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993). 
Access to information may become a problem for purchasers, pushing them towards a 
limited number of well know providers. Not all users are able to fully understand the 
information they are provided with, and service suppliers may require an additional fee 
for the provision of information, with negative implications for equity. Even where in-
formation is available, it may be so vast that choice becomes difficult, thereby pushing 
users towards a ‘default’ bundle of services that is predefined by the provider.  
A related condition for freedom of choice refers to minimization of transaction costs 
and control of uncertainty. Transactions within quasi-markets are often multidimension-
al, and involve sophisticated service activities, with high uncertainty on future demand 
for these types of services. Transaction costs may be high both ex-ante, as they refer to 
preparation, negotiation and safeguard of an exchange contract, as well as ex-post, as 
they refer to the monitoring of results and dispute resolution (Bartlett and Le Grand, 
1993). At the micro-level, transaction costs may impact on individuals’ freedom of 
choice as they affect dimensions such information, control, size and variety of the offer-
ing, time required to choose, and new administrative systems (Greve, 2003). Users need 
information on the quality and price of the services, but providers also need information 
on the form and measure of the payments they will receive, and the incentives they can 
access.  
Information asymmetries can hinder the functioning of quasi-markets and limit free-
dom of choice, and therefore require mechanisms to address them: accreditation and 
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evaluation systems play a role in this respect as they provide information on the availa-
ble offerings and their characteristics, while also ensuring a certain degree of quality 
(Scrivens, 1996), and possibly incentives for continuous quality and safety improve-
ment (Trivellato et al., 2011). Linked to accreditation is the issue of monitoring and 
evaluation, ensuring that providers behave in the appropriate way, and that users can 
exercise choice (Brugnoli and Vittadini, 2008). Evaluation in this context requires the 
identification of indicators of output as well as outcome, which requires an adequate 
data gathering system; performance indicators may be developed and specified already 
at the accreditation stage, so that they can be monitored over time as part of the evalua-
tion process. Moreover, evaluation should focus not only on quantitative measures of 
efficiency, but also on quality and effectiveness, and the results of the evaluation pro-
cess need to be clear and accessible in order to reduce the negative impact of infor-
mation asymmetries on users.  
Fiscal subsidiarity 
Fiscal subsidiarity may be defined as the set of public resources aimed at supporting the 
demand and supply of services. Such resources can take the form of direct or indirect 
transfers (e.g. vouchers, endowments) or tax deductions, exemptions, and other fiscal 
benefits (Brugnoli and Vittadini, 2008; Agasisti et al. 2010). Vouchers are given by 
public administrations to individuals and families in order to finance the consumption of 
specified services. They can be given ex-post as a reimbursement for expenses which 
have already been borne (so called ‘buoni’), or they can be given ex-ante to finance ac-
cess to services with pre-identified providers. The endowment, on the other hand, is a 
set of financial resources and services which are ascribed to individuals in order to reach 
a certain objective. For instance, in Lombardy this instrument is used to help the indi-
vidual build and reinforce his/her human capital: there are three different endowment 
systems focusing on education, training, and employment services (Agasisti et al. 2010). 
While vouchers and endowments are used to support demand, fiscal benefits are often 
used to support the supply of services by private, mostly non-profit, organizations. For 
instance, in Italy non-profit organizations qualify for fiscal benefits due to a national 
law (D.Lgs. 460/1997), which in Lombardy are supplemented by exemptions on taxes 
which are collected at the regional level (such as the regional tax on productive activi-
ties and the regional tax on vehicles) (Agasisti et al. 2010). Thanks to these fiscal bene-
fits, additional resources have been made available and re-invested in the production 
process, thereby supporting the sector’s development and salary increases (IReR 2008). 
METHOD AND DATA 
The conditions for efficient, effective and equitable functioning of quasi-markets and 
horizontal subsidiarity outlined in the preceding section were the basis for the analysis 
of the case study of the Lombardy system of employment services - whose design was 
inspired by the principles set by these theories - so as to explore the extent of actual 
compliance and possible implementation problems which may have occurred. In addi-
tion to publicly available information on the institutional dimensions and characteristics 
provided by the Lombardy regional government, the article relies on empirical data 
from a selection of endowment programs. The data was provided by GEFO, the regional 
information system used to store and organize the administrative data which are gath-
ered from various sources, with the collaboration of the DG Education, Training and 
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Employment of the Lombardy regional administration. The data was gathered, analysed 
and processed for the purpose of experimenting evaluation and ranking methods to be 
adopted by the Independent evaluator. This exercise was carried out by IReR in the 
years 2009-2010, with the support of three academic research teams. Details and results 
of this experimentation are provided in IReR (2010). The selection of the endowment 
programs to be analysed was carried out with the close collaboration of the DG Educa-
tion, Training and Employment of the Lombardy regional administration, based on their 
information and evaluation needs.     
Data on the beneficiaries’ employment condition after the conclusion of the endow-
ment program was obtained from the so-called ‘compulsory communications’ (comuni-
cazioni obbligatorie) which public and private employers are required to transmit to 
provincial administrations. Data on endowments are as of June 1, 2010. As for compul-
sory communications, data gathered until August 22, 2010 was processed, so as to pro-
duce a comprehensive view of the situation as of July 31, 2010.  
The data refers to the implementation of the following endowment programs pub-
lished in the year 2009: Training endowment and Work endowment (program n. 291); 
Training endowment and Work endowment (program n. 334); Welfare support endow-
ment (program n. 309). The main features of the beneficiaries of all five endowment 
programs are outlined in Table 1 below.  
Table 1: Main features of the selected endowments’ beneficiaries1 
Variable  % 
Gender (tot. 88,911) 
 
Female 49.9 



















Education (tot. 88,042) No education 
Primary education 
First-level secondary education 
Second-level secondary education (2-3 years) 
Second-level secondary education (4-5 years) 
Tertiary education (3 years) + IFTS training course 
Tertiary education (4-5 years) 










Nationality (tot. 88,911) Foreign 
 
17.6 
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Source: IReR (2010) 
DOES LOMBARDY’S EMPLOYMENT SERVICES SYSTEM COMPLY WITH THE PRINCIPLES 
OF HORIZONTAL SUBSIDIARITY? 
Established in 1970, Italian regions have been extremely weak in the first years of their 
existence because their powers were prescribed in extreme detail by national legislation, 
they had little financial autonomy, and their laws were to be scrutinized pre-emptively 
by the central government (Colombo 2008). Beginning in 1996, a series of reforms 
aimed at administrative simplification, introduction of managerial tools, and functional 
devolution to local administrations (Mele 2010); since 1999, regions have control over 
their own statutes, electoral systems and forms of government. Moreover, the amend-
ment of Title V of the Italian Constitution in 2001 brought the following additional 
changes: abolition of the formal hierarchical superiority of the state over local authori-
ties; explicit definition of the fields of exclusive national competence, and those of 
shared competence between the national and the regional authorities, with all remaining 
policy areas left to the regional sphere; ability for regions to establish relationships with 
other countries’ sub-national authorities, and to give direct application to EU legislation 
in their field of competence; suppression of pre-emptive central government control of 
regional legislation; and right for the central government to invade regional competence 
only in order to preserve national unity and security, basic civil and social rights, and 
international and EU law. 
Within this context of significant devolution to regional governments, the principle 
of horizontal subsidiarity has been crucial in driving the recent reform of the education, 
training and employment system in Lombardy. Moreover, this reform was made possi-
ble by a comprehensive reform of the labour market implemented a few years earlier at 
the national level, which gave significant autonomy to regional governments in these 
areas of policy. Two national laws (n. 469/1997 and 30/2003) abolished the public mo-
nopoly in the provision of employment services, thereby opening the market to private 
(profit and non-profit) providers, which were to coexist with the traditional Public Em-
ployment Services (Centri per l’Impiego) and other providers such as universities, 
foundations, chambers of commerce, secondary schools, business associations, and oth-
ers. Finally, the Italian reform grants regions wide freedom in the choice of the specific 
model to be adopted for the management and provision of employment services. Public 
and private providers may seek accreditation at the regional level, and thus become in-
struments of active policy and receive public resources to perform the related activities. 
Regional governments are bound to create a list of all private and public accredited pro-
viders, and to define rules and norms for accreditation and for cooperation between pri-
vate and public providers. Following these developments, the Lombardy regional gov-
ernment reformed its training and employment policies through the regional law n. 
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22/2006, toward the implementation of the principle of horizontal subsidiarity.  
The analysis of Lombardy’s employment services system shows that it was struc-
tured as a quasi-market by design as far as the following features are concerned:  
• There is a clear separation between the public actor financing the services, and 
the public and private bodies which provide them.  
• The public actor regulates the system, and relies on instruments such as the 
‘endowment’ to transfer financial resources to the providers which are actually 
chosen by the users.  
• Providers need to satisfy certain requirements which are verified through a 
process of authorization (at the national level) and accreditation (at the region-
al level), and compete with each other to attract users. 
• Services are provided by several public, private, and non-profit organizations. 
• Users can choose among providers (as long as the latter are accredited). 
The regional government is also in charge of monitoring and evaluation, which is 
carried out through the activities of three bodies that were purposefully created by the 
regional law n. 22/2006 (Albonetti and Violini, 2008). The Regional agency for educa-
tion, training, and employment provides technical support for the integration of educa-
tion, training and employment policies, in order to suggest organizational models to 
integrate services and ensure shared responsibility of the organizations involved. The 
Regional labor market observatory is in charge of gathering and analysing data aimed at 
assessing policies’ effectiveness. The Independent evaluator ensures the quality of the 
services offered by public and private providers: this role is to be played by an inde-
pendent body for a period of four years, with a service contract specifying the minimum 
resources to be employed by the evaluator, the number of assessments to be performed, 
and the reports to be submitted. Evaluation in this context is meant as having a strategic 
role, as it addresses the following needs: (i) accountability of the results of the admin-
istration’s activities; (ii) fine-tuning and adjustment of policy planning and program-
ming; (iii) provision of information (for internal and external users) on the reliability of 
the network of service providers (IReR, 2010). However, these provisions were not ful-
ly implemented, especially as far as the crucial role of the Independent evaluator is con-
cerned: no independent body was involved, as responsibility for evaluation was con-
ferred to Eupolis Lombardia, a research and training institution which is part of the re-
gional administration. 
The analysis of the beneficiaries of the endowment programs n. 291, 309 and 334 
depicts a situation where certain categories of job-seekers appear to be advantaged. The 
age composition of the beneficiaries is slightly biased towards young adults: approxi-
mately 40% of the beneficiaries are 40 years old or older, and the most frequent five-
year age groups are those between 30 and 40. Individuals at the two extreme age groups 
are relatively less present, as they usually benefit from other welfare programs, such as 
school for the youth and pensions for the elderly. In terms of education, more than 60% 
hold a tertiary education degree, and almost half of this group holds a post-graduate 
degree, which may be explained through the following, possibly complementary, moti-
vations. First, in Lombardy the returns to some tertiary education degrees are so low 
that people who hold them prefer a path through active labour policies rather than direct 
entrance in the labor market. Second, the links between university and labour market are 
so weak (at least in some disciplines) that they require additional measures to promote 
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the matching between jobseekers and employers. Third, it is likely that many of these 
post-graduate degrees have been gained through programs whose real function is in-
come support rather than advanced training, as in the case of many EU-financed pro-
grams implemented in the past few years. As for the employment condition of the bene-
ficiaries before their entrance in the endowment system, the ‘compulsory communica-
tions’ from employers show that approximately 43% were employed, mostly with me-
dium-low level jobs. Less than 10% (9.2%) were employed in technical jobs, 14.7% 
were white collar employees, 8.8% were medium level employees in the services sector, 
22.5% were artisans and qualified workers, with the rest being low qualification jobs.  
Information on the employment condition of the beneficiaries was also gathered 90 
and 180 days after the conclusion of the endowment program. After 90 days, 43% of the 
beneficiaries are employed: they are mostly male (45.2% vs 41.9% female), in the age 
group 26-40 (48.3%) and with tertiary education (53.6%). The employment rate of the 
beneficiaries with only primary education is remarkably low (8.5%): this is likely due to 
the fact that beneficiaries with low levels of education accessed mainly the Welfare 
support endowment, which appears to have been an income support measure rather than 
a program in support of employability and human capital building (IReR 2010). 
Actual separation between services financing and provision, but concentrated 
endowment distribution among providers 
The regional government is in charge of the initiation and direction of the policy pro-
cess, including definition of available resources, while public and private providers are 
in charge of implementation, which includes the definition of the services to be offered, 
the establishment of a network of providers where convenient, and the actual provision 
of the services.  
The market is characterized by multiple providers: the regional lists of accredited 
providers include 239 organizations for employment services, and 674 for education 
and vocational training services (both lists can be downloaded from the website of the 
Lombardy region). However, in order to ensure freedom of choice and avoid monopoly 
situations, the quasi-market of service providers needs to be competitive.  
Table 2: Training endowment and Work endowment 
 Total progr. 291 Total progr. 334 Total progr. 309 
Number of awarded endowments 24,650* 14,663* 67,285* 
Number of beneficiaries 24,545* 14,659* 50,021* 
Average duration per endowment (days) 244.75 123.78 80.85 
Number of service providers who have 
applied for the endowment (‘endowment-
manager’) 
199 178 141 
* The number of beneficiaries is lower than the number of endowments because several individuals 
moved from one service provider (‘endowment-manager’) to another, and this implied the assignment of 
a new endowment number. 
Source: IReR (2010) 
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Limited freedom of choice 
Freedom to choose requires the ability for users to access information about who are the 
players in the relevant market and their characteristics. In the Lombardy system of em-
ployment services, this information need is firstly addressed through a two-tier evalua-
tion system.  
The first level refers to ex ante evaluation through the double system of authoriza-
tion and accreditation. Accreditation is not a permanent status, as organizations may 
possess but subsequently lose the features that are required to obtain the status. Infor-
mation to be provided for accreditation relates to: a) legal and financial requirements; b) 
existence of a certified system for quality management; c) adequacy of the premises as 
well as the technological and ICT instruments; d) economic and financial reliability; e) 
availability of adequate professional competences; f) relations with local organizations 
and stakeholders. Moreover, accreditation in this perspective is meant to be not only a 
tool for the selection of potential providers, but also an instrument to strive at the con-
tinuous improvement of services. The aim is to create a stable pact between the provid-
ers and the regional administration, founded on the principles of participation and re-
sponsibility, with the common objective of offering an adequate response to the diverse 
demand of training and employment services (Albonetti and Violini, 2008).  
The second level refers to ex post evaluation of the providers through a rating which 
includes the results of the accreditation process and the providers’ performance on the 
activities financed with public funds. This rating also allows to compare and benchmark 
the service providers. The rating is based on the calculation of a composite indicator, 
integrating the evaluation and accreditation components. The scores are calculated by 
accounting for differences among providers in areas such as: types of training services 
offered, target, and type of accreditation awarded to the provider. The information sys-
tem requires the provider to insert directly the relevant data at two different points in 
time: yearly for structural data; quarterly for data on activities and beneficiaries. Scores 
are then calculated both quarterly and yearly, in order to create separate rankings based 
on the type of accreditation; in addition, providers can monitor their performance in a 
restricted-access area, where they can find the scores of the individual indicators and 
sub-indicators. But as mentioned above, the effectiveness of such carefully designed 
evaluation system is undermined by the fact that the role of the Independent evaluator 
was assigned to an organization which is, in fact, part of the regional administration.    
To choose among the accredited providers, users need to be granted with all neces-
sary information at a reasonable cost. To this aim, the Lombardy region website in-
cludes a large section dedicated to the DG Education, Training, and Employment, where 
information on policies and actors is published, including: the lists of accredited provid-
ers of employment services and of education and vocational training services; the rank-
ings of providers based on the relevant ratings; a searching tool based on types of train-
ing courses, names or locations of providers, and free keywords; and specific infor-
mation on the various endowment programs as they are published at different times.  
While this information system is meant to support the users’ decision-making pro-
cess, several issues need to be taken into consideration. For instance, the endowments 
within each program are provided on first-come, first-served basis, until the available 
resources are used up. This creates the risk that not all targeted users are in fact granted 
access to the endowments. Comparing the potential beneficiaries (population within the 
Lombardy region with the characteristics specified by the programme) and real benefi-
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ciaries (individuals who did in fact receive the endowment and the related services) of 
the two Training and Work endowment programs listed above indicates that not all cat-
egories of potential beneficiaries have equal access. Those who are younger, with a 
higher level of education, and are former employees of medium and large-sized enter-
prises tend to have easier access to the programs. This is likely due to the fact that 
jobseekers with relatively higher socio-economic status are more capable of accessing 
and processing the relevant information on available programs, providers, and services, 
and also because these categories are easier to contact on the part of the providers. In 
fact, it appears that in most cases the providers recruit the beneficiaries, rather than the 
beneficiaries choose among the providers. This was the case especially for the Welfare 
support endowment (programme n. 309), where the request was to be submitted by 
firms in crisis for the benefit of their employees: the firms were then included in a list 
maintained by the regional administration, which could be accessed by the service pro-
viders. These could then, in turn, contact the firm and the potential beneficiaries in order 
to offer their services (IReR 2010).  
Moreover, collective training programs are activated only when a minimum number 
of participants is reached. This implies that, even if a certain course is theoretically of-
fered by a certain provider, in practice it may not, unless a certain number of users apply 
for it. The user has the possibility to turn to another provider, but this option involves 
the time and (transaction) costs needed to gain the relevant information from other pro-
viders. Different endowment programs have different requirements, which implies pos-
sibly lengthy verification every time a potential user gets in contact with a provider.  
Partial fiscal subsidiarity and unbalanced allocation of services 
The instrument designed to finance access to training and employment services for 
specified targets of users is the endowment (dote). It is a set of resources to be used by 
an individual with certain characteristics, in order to access training and other employ-
ment services in support of labour market participation. It also offers financial support 
to laid-off workers in order to facilitate program participation; it can be accessed only 
by residents of the Lombardy region. Based on labor market dynamics and policy pri-
orities, different endowment programs with a predefined duration are announced and 
subsequently implemented. These are usually targeted at specific groups of individuals, 
such as temporary workers, or employees of firms in difficult financial conditions. The 
endowment was conceived as an instrument to promote and maintain individuals’ hu-
man capital throughout their life. For this reason, an ‘endowment system’ was envis-
aged, which includes different types of endowments to be used at different stages of the 
individual’s development: education, training, and work endowment (Albonetti and 
Violini 2008). 
Individuals are provided with a financial endowment, which they can use to acquire 
labour market services supplied by public or accredited private agencies. These agen-
cies, together with the individuals/customers, draft a ‘Personalized Plan of Activities’ 
(PPA) which clearly states the commitments to be fulfilled by both parties, thereby forc-
ing the agency to supply the agreed services (or otherwise lose access to public fund-
ing), and the individual to progress along the pre-identified path (or otherwise lose the 
right to the endowment). On the operational side, several macro-categories of services 
allow the choice of those that are most needed and suitable to the individual’s profile 
and needs. On the accounting side, limits are set on expenses for different categories of 
services; implemented activities and related costs have to be certified by the agency, and 
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will be reimbursed only at the end of each PPA. Therefore, the resources are not given 
directly to the individual, who is then able to use them to purchase services (as in the 
case of vouchers, for instance), but are given directly to the service providers once the 
PPA has already been concluded.  
Within the three examined endowment programs, the services offered to jobseekers 
may be grouped under three headings: (i) introductory interviews and definition of the 
services path; (ii) training; (iii) internship and job placement. The most frequently pro-
vided group of services is the first one, which was accessed by more than 80% of the 
beneficiaries; more than 70% attended a course, whereas almost 39% accessed an in-
ternship or a job placement program. Each beneficiary attended more than one support 
meeting with the provider (on average more than 5 per beneficiary), while attending 
only one training course and only one job placement programme. 
The general data referring to all selected endowment programs may be better under-
stood when looking at the same data for the three types of programs – Training, Work, 
and Welfare support – as outlined in tables 3, 4 and 5.  
Table 3: Services path within the selected Training endowment programmes accord-
ing to gender, age group, and education. 
 introductory inter-
views and definition 











Female 3.0  99.9 24.8 0.05 1.53 0.26 
Male 2.0  99.9 14.8 0.03 1.49 0.15 
Aged <26 2.4  99.9 27.4 0.04 1.58 0.28 
Aged 26-40 3.8  99.9 22.6 0.06 1.58 0.23 
Aged >40 1.0   99.9 5.6 0.02 1.32 0.06 
Primary edu. 0.0  100.0 6.9 0.00 1.45 0.07 
Secondary edu. 2.9   99.9 23.9 0.05 1.53 0.25 
Tertiary edu.  1.9   100.0 14.0 0.03 1.49 0.14 
Total 2.5   99.9 19.8 0.04 1.51 0.20 
N 10,621 10,621 10,621 10,621 10,621 10,621 
Note: the first three columns report the % of beneficiaries who received at least one service; the last three 
columns report the average number of services received. 
Source: IReR (2010) 
Services provided within the Training endowment programmes are mainly related to 
training courses. Each beneficiary attended, on average, one course and a half, while the 
role of the interviews is relatively limited and only one fifth of the beneficiaries ac-
cessed an internship or a job placement service. This suggests that the relationship be-
tween the training and the opportunity of finding a job is not particularly strong.  
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Table 4: Services path within the selected Work endowment programs according to 
gender, age group, and education. 
 introductory inter-
views and definition 











Female 100.0  94.0 96.5 4.85 1.50 1.97 
Male 100.0  92.7 97.9 4.90 1.55 1.88 
Aged <26 100.0   94.4 97.2 4.83 1.47 1.86 
Aged 26-40 100.0   93.6 96.8 4.87 1.49 1.95 
Aged >40 100.0    92.2 97.3 4.92 1.62 2.00 
Primary edu. 100.0  91.8 95.3 4.81 1.35 2.07 
Secondary 
edu. 
100.0  93.8 97.8 4.83 1.56 1.95 
Tertiary edu.  100.0  94.4 97.6 4.98 1.63 1.79 
Total 100.0  93.4 97.0 4.87 1.52 1.94 
N 28,269 28,269 28,269 28,269 28,269 28,269 
Note: the first three columns report the % of beneficiaries who received at least one service; the last three 
columns report the average number of services received. 
Source: IReR (2010) 
In the case of the Work endowment, on average each beneficiary was able to access all 
three types of services: more than four interviews, one course and a half, and two job 
placement services. 
Table 5: Services path within the selected Welfare support endowment programs ac-
cording to gender, age group, and education. 
 introductory inter-
views and definition 











Female 100.0  64.9 15.4 6.41 1.26 0.21 
Male 100.0  63.1 15.8 6.33 1.15 0.21 
Aged <26 100.0   59.4 12.7 6.20 1.07 0.17 
Aged 26-40 100.0  63.3 15.9 6.34 1.19 0.22 
Aged >40 75.5  49.6 12.2 6.42 1.24 0.22 
Primary edu. 100.0  91.7 16.7 6.33 2.42 0.25 
Secondary edu. 100.0  64.7 16.4 6.31 1.19 0.22 
Tertiary edu.  84.9   54.1 13.1 6.37 1.20 0.21 
Total 87.3  55.8 13.7 6.36 1.20 0.21 
N 57,273 57,273 57,273 50,021 50,021 50,021 
Note: the first three columns report the % of beneficiaries who received at least one service; the last three 
columns report the average number of services received. 
Source: IReR (2010) 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The implementation of the Lombardy system of employment services does show that a 
considerable effort was made to apply the principles of quasi-markets and horizontal 
subsidiarity, and the related conditions for effective functioning. But some trends and 
dimensions deserve closer scrutiny, as well as medium to long term examination, to 
better understand their implications and intervene if necessary.  
The Lombardy market for employment services is characterized by multiple provid-
ers, but with a concentration of endowments with a small number of providers. It is pos-
sible that this results from market dynamics and the related higher success of these pro-
viders in reaching the desired outcomes; however, these may also be larger and more 
diversified firms with significant internal and external resources, which may end up 
benefiting from this condition at the expense of smaller and less diversified providers. 
Larger and for-profit organizations are able to invest more in communication, so as to 
raise awareness of these programs among jobseekers, for instance through advertising, 
and direct them towards their own services. They are also more likely to be able to 
reach those minimum numbers of applicants that are actually required to activate a 
training course, thereby reducing, from the viewpoint of the user, the uncertainty and 
the transaction costs that may be linked to approaching a smaller and less well known 
provider.    
Overall, providers tend to be motivated at least partially by financial considerations: 
several (such as temporary work agencies) are private, for-profit firms. The employment 
services sector also tends to be less sensitive to this issue as may be the case with other 
welfare services, such as health-care or social services. As for the risk of cream-
skimming, the rating system does take into account the problem of case-mixing, i.e. the 
fact that people entering the system may have different characteristics which may influ-
ence their outcomes. Possibly more influential is that resources are given to the provider 
at the end of the PPA, and not once a medium-term employment outcome has been 
reached. This would likely induce providers to take on difficult users and provide them 
with services anyway, independently from the likelihood of a successful outcome in the 
longer term. This illuminates an important feature and potential limitation of this sys-
tem: services are indeed combined and tailored on the individual’s needs, but only up to 
a certain amount based on the resources of the individual endowment, and not until the 
need is satisfied (as would be the case, for instance, in health-care services). On the oth-
er hand, information on actual beneficiaries shows that they tend to have a relatively 
high level of education and socio-economic status, pointing to the existence of a self-
selection process which reduces the occurrence of especially difficult cases.     
Data on transaction costs borne by providers and by users are not available, but 
some considerations may be proposed. The regional administration provides a signifi-
cant amount of information, including providers’ ratings and rankings; the cost of such 
information provision is shared, because the ranking is computed by the regional admin-
istration, but the relevant data need to be submitted quarterly and yearly by the provid-
ers. On the other hand, the calculation of quality indicators and sub-indicators benefits 
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providers as a support to continuous quality improvement. The providers’ actual offer-
ing is different from the theoretical offering, and moving to another provider involves 
transaction costs for the user. While there is an online information system on the cours-
es offered by different providers, users need to get in contact to verify whether the 
course is indeed offered or not. This appears to be reasonable as it is a necessary dimen-
sion of a flexible and personalized system (in a standardized system the offering is well 
known at the outset as there is no variation). At the same time, this personalization can-
not be taken to the extreme, as providers need to ensure their financial sustainability. On 
the other hand, beneficiaries are often enticed with the objective to reach the ‘critical 
mass’ that is required to initiate certain programs, even if such programs do not really 
constitute the best available answer to their needs. 
As for the coordination of the entire system, especially important is the evaluation 
system, which includes ex-ante accreditation as well as ex-post evaluation. However, 
particularly important are also the principles of responsibility and freedom which in-
spire this approach (Albonetti and Violini, 2008; Brugnoli and Vittadini, 2008; Agasisti 
et al., 2010), whereby providers on the supply side and users on the demand side are 
given autonomy and are trusted in their ability to offer and to choose a solution which is 
adequate to the users’ needs. Goal congruence (O’Toole, 2003) is meant to be ensured 
at the design stage by the quasi-market system, where competition pushes providers 
towards ever greater responsiveness to users’ needs. Goal alignment at different levels 
is accomplished through a system where the regional government focuses on micro-
level objectives such as individuals’ employability and quality of services, which are 
usually shared by non-profit service providers. As for for-profit providers, they are as-
sessed, rated, and indirectly rewarded by an evaluation system focusing on these same 
final objectives, so that the goals tend ultimately to be aligned. However, the overall 
evaluation system suffers from the fact that one of its pillars, the Independent evaluator, 
has seen its function conferred to Eupolis Lombardia, a research institution that is part 
of the regional administration, thereby raising doubts about the independence of its 
judgments; moreover, the results of the assessments performed by Eupolis Lombardia 
are not publicly available. 
The results reached in terms of employment condition of the beneficiaries after the 
conclusion of the programmes themselves confirm that the main weakness of this ap-
proach is inadequate consideration of the equity dimension. The available data demon-
strates that those who are younger, are educated at a higher level, and are former em-
ployees of medium and large-sized enterprises tend to have easier access to \programs 
and therefore have better employment prospects. This selection bias of beneficiaries is 
also supported by a system which works on a first-come, first-served basis: a quota sys-
tem would allow greater opportunity of access to all the categories included in the pro-
gram (IReR, 2010). Beneficiaries with relatively lower socio-economic status benefit 
from the program in terms of income support, but this does not necessarily improve 
their employability, which is meant to be the one of the most important aims of active 
labor market policies. Moreover, the regional law n. 19/2007 which drove most the re-
forms mentioned here uses frequently the terms ‘individual’ (persona) as well as ‘free-
dom’ (libertà); terms such as ‘society’, ‘equity’, ‘inequity’, ‘cohesion’ are notably ab-
sent (Trivellato, 2008).  
Overall, the outcomes of the programs analyzed here are certainly linked to a num-
ber of contextual dimensions that are specific to this regional and national environment. 
But the analysis points to a number of insights that may be instrumental to the develop-
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ment of both theory and practice.  
From a theory viewpoint, this case especially contributes to the conceptualization of 
‘horizontal subsidiarity’ by suggesting that reliance on freedom and responsibility, both 
on the demand and the supply side (Brugnoli and Vittadini, 2008) may not be adequate 
to reach the desired outcomes. Providers’ behaviors as induced by market forces may 
not generate the right decisions for the implementation of policy goals, and not all users 
may be in the condition to take the right decisions for the satisfaction of their needs. 
Future research should explore further the elements and dynamics that drive actors’ be-
haviors in their relation to policy goals.  
Similar considerations can be proposed from the viewpoint of practice: public offi-
cials in charge of planning of active labor market policies need to be aware of the multi-
ple implications of different designs of incentive systems. For instance, in the case of 
the endowment programs analyzed here, the Personalized Plan of Activities is meant to 
be a tool where service provider and user build together a path that is meant to improve 
the user’s employability if not to ensure a job. However, the jobseeker will most likely 
be unaware of the skills where s/he should invest based on his/her current profile and 
potential. This type of knowledge is owned in theory by the service provider, but the 
latter will have an incentive to fill in a limited number of more general training courses 
rather than distribute users among more specialized courses that may be more conducive 
to employment for the single beneficiary, but are too expensive for the service provider.  
Moreover, Bailey (2006) notes that positive or negative implications are not gener-
ated by freedom of choice, but rather by the conditions where decision-making systems 
operate. The distributional impact will depend on who finances the services, who de-
cides the conditions for access, but also on the ability for citizens to choose in an in-
formed way. It is very difficult to define clearly the impact on equity, because such im-
pact depends on factors such as (Greve 2009): the existing context and conditions be-
fore the introduction of greater freedom of choice; the conditions for such greater free-
dom to take place; the results of such change; and who will pay for the additional trans-
action costs (if they are not balanced by corresponding efficiency gains). Empirical evi-
dence confirms that the benefits of freedom of choice (with limited negative impact for 
equity) are strongly linked to factors such as the socio-economic characteristics of users 
and their education levels  (Wilson 2009; Rummery 2009; Fenger 2009), the character-
istics of the institutional context (Blank 2009), and the features and forms taken by poli-
cies and services, especially when coupled with a specific cultural or institutional con-
text (Eichler and Pfau-Effinger 2009; Rummery 2009; Saxonberg 2009). The case of 
Lombardy confirms that these issues, and especially their interactions, need to be close-
ly taken into account by public administrators involved in the design of a system for 
public services provision which values highly users’ freedom of choice.  
In summary, the design of an appropriate incentive system for private providers appears 
to be a critical issue, together with mechanisms that ensure the implementation (at ac-
ceptable costs) of mechanisms that satisfy all the requirements of a comprehensive and 
reliable information system. These should be coupled with a specific focus on the pos-
sible negative impacts on equity. 
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NOTES 
 
1 Note 1 The total number of beneficiaries exceeds 96,000; however, data are missing 
for a number of variables for approximately 7,000 beneficiaries. The relevant total 
number of beneficiaries is referred to in the table. 
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